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David Urquhart

Naval Power Suppressed by the Maritime States

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NAVAL POWER

SUPPRESSED

BY THE

MARITIME STATES.

CRIMEAN WAR.

By DAVID URQUHART, ESQ.

(TRANSLATED FROM THE "REVUE DE GRENOBLE.")

. . . . *Trepidus vulgaverat omnia rumor,*
Ignorare tamen fingit, regnique ruinas
Dissimulat. CLAUDIAN.

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NAVAL POWER

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BY THE

MARITIME STATES.

CRIMEAN WAR.





By DAVID URQUHART, ESQ.

(Reprinted from the "Diplomatic Review.")

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Naval Power suppressed by the Maritime States.*

CRIMEAN WAR.

St. Gervais, Haute Savoie, Sep. 18, 1873.

SIR,—Were I to treat this subject as a lawyer I should simply give extracts from the great Compilation of St. LOUIS and the Ordinances of FRANCIS I. and HENRY IV., in order to show that the seizure of enemies' property at sea was the right and the heritage of France when at war, and that it was also her most sacred duty.

But those who desire to learn the truth have these sources of information within their reach and under their hands. What use then would it serve to give an exposition of them? These laws exist, and this history is written; and yet you have arrived at the point at which you now are; that of having undergone a terrible defeat by refusing to employ this force and by not fulfilling this duty. You have arrived at it by a process of false logic, namely, that of substituting a generality in the place of examination, and of extinguishing memory by uttering a proposition. Instead of concentrating all your means of carrying on a war against your enemy, you busied yourselves with speculations on the liberty of commerce. That which appears to me, then, important to do, is to give a sketch of the operation which has deprived you of your maritime strength; an operation in substance diplomatic, in its accidental and external character only military. This operation is known in history as the Crimean War.

Strategical details come thus within the scope of a legal publication, because the movements of troops and the phases of law are so entangled that it becomes impossible to comprehend them separately. It is for this reason that both are misunderstood. This law, moreover, relates solely to war, and it is in the practice of it that maritime power resides; that power which exceeds all others, according to the Roman proverb:—"He who commands the sea is master of affairs."

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* Translated from *La Revue des Institutions et du Droit.* Grenoble: Baratier Frères et Dardelet, Grande Rue 4. Paris: Durand et Pedone Lauriel, Rue Cujas 9.

If England had proposed to France, in the month of July, 1870, not to employ artillery against Prussia, what would have been the answer? A cry of indignation would have been raised from Cape Finisterre to the furthermost confines of Corsica. If England had insisted on it, war would have been declared against her, or the war with Prussia would have been abandoned. In any case it would have been understood that England was making common cause with Prussia.

But artillery afloat is quite another thing from artillery on land.

In order to prepare for war France had provided herself with armies; but she had also provided herself with fleets. The use of the latter was to carry and transport guns. The guns so conveyed exceeded in number those which had to accompany her armies, by two and a half times, and they exceeded them in the same ratio as regards weight of metal. Steam was also used in addition to wind for their transport. This steam, calculated according to horse-power, represented a total which exceeded by six times the number of horses allowed for the artillery.

The force therefore which France possessed in her marine was at least five times greater than that which she possessed in her artillery.

This force had its own field, one where armies could not appear. It could reach and strike the enemy at the most distant point of his frontiers, and even carry the war home to his own country at the time he was besieging her capital.* The ships could have transported her armies from the most remote points of her own territory without expense, and without exhausting either men or animals.

To strike the commerce of an enemy is the means of striking at his revenue. A country whose revenue is drawn for the most part from indirect taxes is more exposed to this species of danger than another. The kingdom of Prussia was not one of these. But the war of 1870 was with all Germany, whose collective revenue is drawn almost entirely from indirect taxes. Prussia in this war depended almost entirely on her allies, the other States of Germany; that is to say, on their willingness to act with her. A blow therefore which struck the whole effectively, would for her have been more dangerous than one which fell on her alone.

In the year 1868 the exports from the Zollverein to England amounted to eighteen millions sterling. We may double that for the rest of the world. There must have been, therefore, forty millions of property afloat when the war broke out exposed to the attacks of French cruisers.

At the commencement of hostilities I said that France was going to war with one arm tied behind her back, and I added that it was her *right arm* which was so tied. But this expression falls far short of conveying a true idea of the state of things; for her naval force of itself alone, was sufficient for the reduction of her enemy, if, confining herself at home to defence, she had struck at German commerce on every sea. It was only a question of making

* At the commencement of the war, Prussia, being uncertain of the use which France would make of her navy, had retained 150,000 men to protect her Northern frontiers.

the war last long enough, in order to obtain a triumph. The loss by Prussia in her public securities, and the ruinous expenditure of her treasure, would have been accompanied by the revolt of her allies, by whose aid she has triumphed, and whom, by this triumph, she has reduced to subjection.

But instead of so employing her navy, that navy disappeared. There was no disembarkation on the coasts of the enemy, no blockade of her ports; not even the transport of armies and troops along the coasts of France. No one knew where they were gone; no one knew what had become of those magnificent vessels whose organisation was as admirable as that of the army was corrupt. Above all, there were no cruisers. German commerce flourished from the Gulf of Bothnia to the peninsula of Corea with an impunity as complete as if the war did not exist, or as if France were not the second maritime Power in the world.

But, it will be said, "we had signed the Declaration of Paris."

That was no Treaty at all. It was an abnormal act, without character in itself, without right in the persons who signed it, without ratification by the respective Sovereigns, and which, containing no engagements, contained a lie. It did not pretend to say, "such henceforward shall be the law," but it said such and such is the fact.* (Privateering *is abolished*, &c.)

This was not the reason why the Declaration of Paris was observed; the reason was that France deceived herself. I am unfortunately in a position to bear testimony on this matter by the fruitless efforts which I made to awaken the attention of public men of all opinions as to the result to France of having renounced her rights, and with them her maritime strength. I succeeded only with one, and he was unable to do anything with the others.

But universal error and ignorance would not alone have sufficed to avert from Prussia this danger. Up to a certain moment she had to take measures of precaution.

It was England who came to the assistance of Prussia, and who, by means of a bit of paper, drove away every thought in France of having recourse to her natural arms. A despatch, bearing the signature of Lord GRANVILLE, reminded the Government of France of the Declaration of Paris, with an injunction to conform to it.

Nobody asked why this despatch had been written, or what a despatch to confirm an engagement meant, or if that could really be an engagement which required such aid. Much less was it asked, whether the despatch proceeded from affection for the Declaration, or from a wish to take part against France.

Why this summons if the English Government had no uneasiness with respect to the observance by France of this Declaration of Paris, the signing of which that very Government had explained on the grounds of its being necessary to conciliate France!

How was it that the French Government could accept this despatch

* The Armed Neutrality Treaty of 1780, said: "All merchandise, and all property belonging to the subjects of the said belligerent Powers embarked in neutral bottoms, *shall be* free, with the exception of contraband of war.

without exacting the support of England as a consideration, or without even informing itself of her intentions? That which is truly instructive in all this is not the catastrophe, but the disorder in the public service. It was a reciprocal suicide which was the result of ignorance. England, by prostrating France, gave herself a blow more terrible than that which her neighbour received; for France might recover herself, England could not.

There are, however, not many despatches to turn over in order to discover the key to the enigma.

Only two years previously hostilities were on the point of breaking out between France and Prussia, with regard to Luxembourg. England on that occasion (for reasons not more her own than those which produced the despatch of Lord GRANVILLE) sought to restrain the ill-feeling existing between the two countries, and to avert its explosion. She went to work with Prussia very simply by saying: "Do not trust to the Declaration of Paris. If a war breaks "out France will never consent to deprive herself of her maritime "strength, against which you have nothing to oppose, and she will "sweep German commerce from the oceans and the seas."

It is possible that France may not have had a copy of these despatches. The English Government, however, had the courtesy to publish them in the Blue-Book relating to Luxemburg,*

But this publicity has, for the French Government, been of no avail. What is certain is, that this despatch, beside which all the political operations sink into insignificance, has never been the subject of a remark in the press, either in England or France, and has never been referred to in any parliamentary debate, in any political discussion, or in any newspaper.

There is, after all, in this, nothing to excite surprise, seeing that the document related to matters of which no one comprehended a word, with the exception of a very small number, who only comprehended them too well. Nor is it the only important document. There is another which may be placed with it in the same line; but this belongs to the category of things supposed to be understood. I allude to the despatch of the 10th of August, in which Lord GRANVILLE communicated to Lord LYONS the steps which he had taken in concert with Prussia and Russia, with the Governments of Denmark, Italy, and Austria, in order to prevent those countries from coming to the rescue of France. This despatch, just like the other, passed unnoticed!

* Lord Stanley wrote to the English Ambassador at Berlin, on the 17th of April, 1867, as follows: "Prussia has a very long line of coast and forts to defend. She has no means of resisting the action of the French fleets on her own coasts, and the ravages which the naval superiority of France would enable her to commit on German commerce, not only in Europe, but everywhere else where this commerce is actively carried on, might lead to a financial crisis alarming for Germany. It is important that Prussia should attend to these considerations."

On the 17th of April, he wrote again: "A war between France and Prussia would not fail to retard that consolidation of Germany towards which so great a progress has been recently made" (the war with Austria).

The day following he wrote thus to the English Ambassador at Paris: "The Government of Her Majesty has not been afraid to present to the Prussian Government the various considerations which ought to decide it on not insisting upon retaining a Prussian garrison in Luxemburg." (*Blue-Book relating to Luxemburg*, 1867.)

The moment the official volume was in my hands this document struck me at once. I lost not an instant of time in calling the attention to it, not only of the men in power, but also of others. I caused it to be distributed, I commented upon it, and I showed it everywhere. It only excited incredulity or alarm, and an excuse was sought for doing nothing—that is, for saying nothing. A French officer said, "I will not believe it unless I see the original;" a politician said, "It raises great "questions." All welcomed as a relief the words "to restrain "the limits of the war," which Lord GRANVILLE had put forward as the object of his negotiation; precisely as Lord PALMERSTON had done in 1848, when I compelled him, before the House of Commons, to justify the analogous measure he had taken (then secretly) to insure the defeat of Poland by menacing at the same time France, Turkey, Austria, Sweden, and Persia.

There yet remains the application which I wish to make of this incident. Eighteen months after the publication of the volume, the Duke de GRAMMONT was ignorant of the existence of this despatch! He warmly thanked the person who sent it to him. It was only two years and a half afterwards that it found a corner for insertion in a French newspaper.* Of course it was not inserted or mentioned in any English newspaper. Such is publicity!

There are here two important inferences to be drawn: 1st. That these steps of an English Minister would have been impossible if he had had previously to state his reasons for them to any non-political man; 2nd. That to make war is not the only means of prostrating a country, and that a Minister who plays an arbitrary part can, by writing a letter, ruin an ally, and do so without the knowledge of his victim and of his own country, while publishing such a letter to the whole world. I believe I have said sufficient to show that the capitulation of Paris in 1871 was the result of the Declaration of Paris in 1856. It remains, however, to relate the history of that Declaration.

The change of which we are speaking was not the result of a congress assembled for the purpose of making it, but of a war; and it was not even slipped into the Treaty of Peace, but into an abnormal act which was annexed to it, without the Plenipotentiaries of any of the Powers having been furnished with authority beforehand to discuss the question.

Never before this epoch had any proposition of the kind been submitted to a deliberative assembly. The decision to change maritime law sprang up all of a sudden, and its success was only due to the absolute secresy with which it had been guarded. The English negotiator (Lord CLARENDON) confessed it in Parliament,† and the

* *L'Univers* of March 29, 1873.

† "Do you think that if the articles of this Treaty, even the bases on which it was founded had been submitted to Parliament, such a Treaty would ever have been signed?" [He was not speaking of the Treaty of Paris, but of the Declaration of Paris].—*Lord Clarendon in the House of Lords, May* 22, 1856.

"Lord Clarendon, in signing at the Congress of Paris the extinction of England's maritime rights, acted (as he afterwards avowed in the House of Lords) without the knowledge of the Queen or the mandate of the Crown. His powers emanated from a *private* letter of Lord Palmerston."—*La Presse* (of Vienna), *Dec.* 25, 1861.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs (M. THOUVENEL) designated it as "the *modern* international law"*—that is to say, that the Declaration of Paris had displaced the Law of Nations which had existed up to that time.

The war referred to was between two Powers called *maritime* and another Power, exclusively territorial and military; the same which had put forward and sustained by arms, since 1780, the new code. That war did not end in the defeat of the maritime Powers and the triumph of the Power which had proposed the new "International Law."

But it was not she who was the proposer of the change at this Peace Congress; the maritime Powers were the proposers of it, especially France; it was she who proposed it, and England who accepted it. Whilst this war was going on, the right of confiscating enemies' goods in neutral ships, in other words, maritime strength, had not been exercised by the maritime Powers; their line of battleships were exhibited on the scene, but uselessly, for the enemy's commerce was allowed to go free. This enemy was enabled to continue the war until the meeting of the Congress of Paris, where, presenting himself as conquered, it became possible that the effacement of maritime power should be accepted; a thing which would have been impossible if presenting himself as conqueror, he had exacted from the conquered the abandonment of their strength in this respect, a strength which constituted all the strength possessed by one, and one half of that possessed by the other. The plan was only feasible on the condition that in making the war the Allies should not make it; that is to say, that they should not interfere with their enemy's commerce, the only point in which Russia was vulnerable, and vulnerable to such a degree that she was absolutely at the mercy of the smallest State which had the power of sending cruisers to sea. Twice already, in the present century, had she been brought to reason by England, without the latter employing against her a single ship of war, even a frigate; without a single regiment, even a battalion. It was this which caused one of the most distinguished Russian diplomatists to say, "We have "nothing to fear from the alliance of France with England, for the "French navy, joined to that of England, will not add to its "strength."

From the Declaration of Paris in 1856, we go back then to the suspension, in 1854, of the Right of Search and Seizure on board neutral vessels, which was stated in the following terms:—

Order in Council, March 28, 1854.†

"In order to preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unne-"cessary obstruction, Her Majesty consents, for the present, to sus-"pend a portion of the belligerent rights which belong to her by the "Law of Nations. Her Majesty will suspend the right of seizing "enemy's property on board neutral vessels, unless it be contraband "of war."

* M. Thouvenel to the French Minister at Washington, Dec. 3, 1851.

† See note, page 16.

Declaration of the Emperor of the French, March 29, 1854.

" His Majesty the Emperor of the FRENCH consents, for the pre-
" sent, to suspend a portion of his rights. The vessels of His Ma-
" jesty will not seize enemy's property on board neutral ships."

The whole then arises from the Crimean War, and it becomes necessary to give the history of that War in order to understand the revolution in the affairs of the world to which it has led. We shall see (putting aside its Turkish phase) that it was made by Russia with the object of attaining this result.

On the 8th of June, 1853, "in the midst of a profound peace, " Russia invaded the territory of Turkey."* This invasion was explained on the ground that it was for the purpose of taking possession of a material guarantee for the acceptance by Turkey of the note of Prince MENSCHIKOFF; a note in which Russia demanded for herself the protection of the Christian subjects of the Sultan against the Sultan. The Powers assembled in conference at Vienna, and not only adopted the note of Prince MENSCHIKOFF, but went beyond it,† and proposed " to insist at Constantinople on the adoption, pure and " simple," of the note which they drew up thereupon.

Russia prevented them from acting at Constantinople, although she had in the first instance accepted the plan. The fact is so stated by the Emperor NAPOLEON himself in a letter addressed by him on the 29th of January, 1854, to the Emperor of RUSSIA.

" But hardly were we informed of this good news" (the acceptance by Russia of the intervention of the Powers at Constantinople), " when " Your Majesty's Minister, by explanatory comments, destroyed its " conciliatory effect, and prevented us from *insisting* at Constantinople " on its adoption pure and simple."

The Porte, which had hoped to receive the support of the Powers, yielded for a time to their importunities, as the same letter of the Emperor avows in these terms:—

" The troops of your Majesty having once entered Wallachia, we " have not the less on our part persuaded the Porte not to consider " this occupation as a case of war."

At length, however, outraged and indignant, she escaped from their control and declared war. The Powers remained "interested but " simple spectators of the struggle" (letter of the Emperor NAPOLEON) until the affair at Sinope.

The Sinope affair was the consequence of the entry of the allied squadrons into the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, an act which the

* Declaration of the French Government, published in an official pamphlet, in February, 1854, under the title of " France and Russia; the Eastern Question," which contains the despatches between the Governments of the two countries, and a letter from the Emperor Napoleon to the Czar. The words quoted are at page 157.

† What was especially offensive to the Porte in the Menschikoff note were the expressions relating to ancient Treaties, as if those Treaties gave the Emperor of Russia the right of interfering in the internal concerns of the Ottoman Empire. The Vienna note took for its basis that the Porte had violated former Treaties, both in letter and spirit; for it demanded from the Porte a declaration that: " His Majesty the Sultan would remain faithful to *the letter and spirit of the stipulations* of the Treaties of Kainardjii and Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian worship."

English Ambassador took advantage of in order to prevent the Turkish fleet from being sent to the Black Sea to protect and bring back the small Turkish squadron which was then at Sinope, exposed to the attack of the whole naval force of Russia, which was tacking about without hindrance in that very Black Sea from which the Allies said they had excluded it. The Turkish squadron at Sinope was composed of seven small *frigates;* the Russian squadron of seven line-of-battle ships (Mr. KINGLAKE says six) and seven or eight frigates. The Russian squadron blockaded the Turks at Sinope for ten days. During that interval, as before, the English Ambassador prevented the Turks from sending their magnificent vessels of the line to Sinope. Had he not done so the attack of the Russians would have been impossible, and the pretext for this war of fraud and ignominy would have been taken away. Nothing was more glorious than the defence of the Turks. Notwithstanding the immense superiority of the Russians, the Turks refused to surrender, and were killed almost to the last man. Out of 4000 men only 400 survived, and all of these were wounded. So greatly did the Russian squadron suffer that one of its ships of the line foundered soon afterwards.

"If there could be any question as regards the military superiority "of the Turks over the Russians, there can be none of their naval "superiority." Such are the words of an Italian diplomatist who was educated in the East.

Do not suppose that I am relating facts either doubtful or obscure. With regard to the action of the English Ambassador, we have the avowal of it in his own words. Among the despatches presented to Parliament, there is one from Lord STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE containing the following sentence:—"I have at this moment" (November 5, 1853), "succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sending a detach-"ment of ships of the line and frigates to the Black Sea."

The English press at the time gave loud vent to its indignation on the news of the catastrophe at Sinope, and broadly and directly attributed it to English policy. "Without the intervention of our ambas-"sador at Constantinople," said the *Morning Advertiser*, "and his "threat to send back the British fleet, if the Turkish fleet entered the "Black Sea, the latter, which was under the command of Admiral "SLADE" (an Englishman) "would have encountered the Russian "fleet and have infallibly destroyed it. On the head of England "therefore rests the crime of Sinope."*

But all this rage had only the effect of preparing the nation to accept the war, which was directed by the same men who, it believed, had betrayed Turkey.

The Emperor continues:—

"The affair at Sinope compels us to take a more decided position ". . . . At the entrance of the Bosphorus there were three thousand "guns, the presence of which said loudly enough to Turkey that the "two first Maritime Powers would not permit her to be attacked "at sea."

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* The opposition journals expressed themselves in similar terms.

A little further on he makes the admission that these three thousand guns had been placed there only for the purpose of preventing the Turks from carrying the war home to Russia.

" *If we prevented the Turks from carrying on an aggressive war on* " *the coasts belonging to Russia,* we protected the revictualment of their " troops in their own territory,"

After the affair at Sinope, the fleets of the two Maritime Powers entered the Black Sea with the object (again to use the words of the French official pamphlet) " of profiting by the taking *possession* of the " Black Sea, in order to induce Turkey to adhere fully to the propo- " sitions contained in the Vienna Note."*

At this period the Russians had been beaten in all the engagements on the Danube, and active operations had been suspended on both sides, the Turks abstaining from profiting by their victories in consequence of the representations of England and France.

At the same time the squadrons of the two Powers appeared in the Black Sea, ostensibly to assist the Turks. But the Emperor of the FRENCH, acting in concert with Queen VICTORIA, made a last attempt to preserve peace by the proposition contained in the letter of the 29th of January, which has been already cited, the purport of which was that the allied squadrons should be recalled from the Black Sea, and that the Russian troops should abandon the Principalities. In that case " Your Majesty preferring to treat directly with Turkey, " would appoint an Ambassador who should negotiate, with the " plenipotentiary of the Sultan, a convention to be submitted to the " conference of the four Powers."

The reply to this overture was the recall of the Russian Ambassadors from Paris and London!

Here then are six distinct steps, in each one of which it will be seen that Russia invited the war, urged on the war, forced the war, and refused the co-operation of the Allies against Turkey. When they had compromised themselves by taking the side of the Porte, she prevented them from escaping from the difficulty; she whose armies had been beaten by the Turks; she who was destitute of the smallest capability for carrying on a war against Maritime Powers according to the forms and usages of war, as war had theretofore been always carried on.

This conduct is positively inexplicable, except on the hypothesis that she had made sure of the men who governed France and England, so that they should arrange to suspend during the war the employment of their maritime strength.

As regards France this was not difficult. She was ignorant of the maritine strength she possessed. Her idea of war at that time was only deduced from the contests she had had to sustain against England, whose naval force was superior to her own. This impression was so

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* " From the moment that we protect Turkey and show our desire to prevent her, to the detriment of Europe, from being overwhelmed by superior forces, it is our *right* and our *duty* to exact her adherence to conditions," &c. Despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the French Ambassador at Constantinople, dated the 28th of December, 1853, when the entry of the fleets in the Black Sea was announced.

strong that Marengo and Austerlitz were considered as nothing by the side of Aboukir and Trafalgar; a circumstance which led BONAPARTE to say in 1806, "When we speak of peace in France, we mean "peace with England." The simple words "Right of Search," caused every Frenchman to tremble. Far from there being any difficulty in bringing about an abandonment of this right, the French minister by whom it should be proposed would be regarded as having accomplished a patriotic work. The circumstances of the two epochs were very different, but the old impressions remained the same. In 1854 it was a question of common interest against a common enemy; but the ideas as to the means of fighting remained the same as they were in 1815. The Right of Search was looked on as an infernal machine, but a machine which must be hostile. People had not as yet come to say, as they did sixteen years afterwards, "Let France perish rather "than the liberty of commerce be touched," but they were on the way to it.

France, therefore, was quite ready, by the medium of the phrase, "liberty of commerce," to assume and to covet the part she was to play in the drama then in preparation.

It was quite otherwise with England, both as regards her knowledge and her passions. The pride of England, as also her strength, lay in her navy, and her navy consisted for her in the faculty of straitening her enemy by carrying off his wealth. An English minister could not yield on this point through ignorance, fatuity, or passion for "the national interest." Here was required, not ignorance, but treason. Russia had there a man of her own, and that man was worth all England; for he knew how to subordinate men to his purposes, and how to play factions one against another; he knew, and this is important as we shall presently see, how to manipulate at will or to lay aside those administrative and judicial forms, the traditions of which have yet in England a living strength, and a solemn authority.

In order to prevent the seizure of the enemy's commerce under a neutral flag, there was required, not a decision of the Cabinet, as in France, but a solemn act drawn up by the Privy Council, sitting in presence of the QUEEN. The capacity, the influence and the art of Lord PALMERSTON not being sufficient to procure this act, he did without it. A document appeared in the *Gazette*, as if it had been an Order in Council. This document, the words of which I have already given, did not bear the name of the QUEEN at the head of it, and was without *signature!*

The document could not have emanated from the Privy Council, for there had been no sitting of that Council since the 9th of March previous, and the supposed order bore date the 28th of March; on which day there had been a meeting of the Cabinet Council at the Foreign Office. The decision as regards the war had therefore been taken in the Cabinet Council, and not in the Privy Council. But a decision of the Cabinet Council has no legal or judicial value. The difference between the two lies in this; that the Cabinet Council is unknown to the law and is a usurpation of the powers of the Privy

Council. The latter assembles in the presence of the Sovereign, and its acts, in so far as they are the legitimate exercise of the royal prerogative, have the force of law. The Cabinet Council is nothing more than a private meeting of the Ministers for the time being. The Members of the Cabinet Council are, it is true, also Members of the Privy Council. But the Privy Council cannot sit unless in the presence of the QUEEN.

The Act published in the *Gazette* of the 28th of March, as an Order in Council, but without the name of the QUEEN at its head or any signature at its foot, makes use in the text of the QUEEN'S name, as if she had been present and had sanctioned the order.

The Act then was not only a fraud but a forgery.*

Lord CLARENDON was at that time Minister for Foreign Affairs, and it was he who was ostensibly responsible. The QUEEN and he were the only persons who had to be considered in the document; the others were nobodies who were entirely in the hands of Lord PALMERSTON. The opposition of the QUEEN is evident from the means taken to suppress it, and to force her hand. Lord CLARENDON was not less hostile to it, as will presently be seen. To him coercion had to be applied.

The war had long been felt to be approaching, and the merchants made it their business to search all over the globe for commodities to replace the hemp, corn, tallow, timber, &c., of the Baltic and the Black Sea, the trade in which would be destroyed by the war. But at the critical moment vague reports were spread that the Allies were going to suspend their maritime action; which had the effect of producing indescribable anxiety in the merchants who were engaged in obtaining supplies from the four quarters of the world. A deputation of them waited on Lord CLARENDON, who appeased their alarm and expressed himself in these terms:—

"Russian produce, which remains enemy's property, though "embarked in a neutral port and in a neutral ship, will be con- "demned."

This occurred on the 25th of March. The secret of the operation then had not been confided to Lord CLARENDON even three days before the Order in Council; and we learn from a *French* source that the whole Cabinet was on that day in the same ignorance; for on the morning of the 28th, Lord COWLEY had announced to the French Government that the English Cabinet had arrived at a unanimous and definitive decision on the subject. These were the words

* The Order in Council for General Reprisals against Russia appears in the *Gazette* in the usual form, beginning as follows: "At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 29th day of March, 1854. Present, the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council." It ends: "From the Court at Buckingham Palace, this twenty-ninth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four." Then follow 18 signatures beginning with that of the Lord Chancellor (Cranworth) and including those of Lord Clarendon, Lord John Russell, Mr. Gladstone, and all the principal Ministers except Lord Palmerston. The pretended Order in Council is headed "DECLARATION." It begins, "Her Majesty the Queen, &c." It ends, "Westminster, March 28, 1854." (The "DECLARATION OF WAR" appears in exactly the same manner, without form and without signature.) An Order in Council of the 15th of April, 1854, speaks of it as the "Royal Declaration" of the 28th March. It does not call it an Order in Council.—ED. DIPLOMATIC REVIEW.

of it: "To maintain the prohibition of neutral commerce between "ports belonging to the enemy . . . ."

How were the QUEEN and Lord CLARENDON compelled to submit, the one to a violation of his word given to the merchants, and the other to the outrage inflicted on Her dignity and honour? Evidently by causing France to intervene; an explanation which Mr. KINGLAKE also gives for the whole of the operations. He represents the other English Ministers as drifting with the current—using the word which Lord CLARENDON himself employed—and Lord PALMERSTON as joyously pursuing the route which he had traced out long before, and that by the support of the Emperor of the FRENCH.

Lord PALMERSTON, on his part, said to the House, epigrammatically and boldly, "The two countries have only one and the same Cabinet, "some of the members of which live on the banks of the Seine, and "the others on those of the Thames."

The course taken by France is entirely concealed in the documents published by the English Government. It was not merely, however, the absence of French documents and despatches which removed every idea of the intervention of France, but words the most direct and explicit testified to the absence of all action on her part. On the 17th of March, the House of Commons having required information respecting the intentions of the Government, Lord JOHN RUSSELL refused to comply with the request, on the ground that before he gave his explanation it was necessary first to communicate the intentions of the English Government to that of France. Here are his own words: "It is necessary, and more especially so with "regard to France, to explain our views in order to learn whether "they are agreeable to the French Government."

By what unforeseen and happy accident then are we in possession of those documents so carefully concealed? What I am about to state would be truly wonderful if we were not marching on from wonder to wonder. After fourteen years and one week, not a word having ever been said in France about the suspension of the Right of Search, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. DROUYN DE LHUYS, took it into his head to present to the Institute of France a memoir on the negotiation, and this memoir was published on the following day in the *Moniteur!*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS, who thus made the Institute a judicial court for public affairs, placed before it, with an affecting frankness, all the despatches and all the documents, by which we unexpectedly see that the French Government of that day undertook the noble task of working in the cause of humanity and liberty against the prejudices, the passions, and the power of England, and brought this thorny negotiation to a happy close.

This revelation places the French Government on the same line as the English with respect to fraud; for M. DROUYN DE LHUYS admits that a false date had been inserted in the essential document, and that the terms of that document contained, upon his hypothesis, a lie.*

* He wrote thus to London on the 24th of March: "The French Government cannot say

I speak of the declaration of the Emperor, which bears date, in the *Moniteur*, March 29, but which was drawn up on the 30th.

There results from it this, that there were only certain members of the French Cabinet who were in the secret. The words, therefore, of Lord PALMERSTON are intelligible in another way, that is to say, that certain members of the two Cabinets had determined the common action of the two countries. I content myself with citing a single passage from this memoir:

"Although the conclusions announced by the English ambassador "(March 28) appeared *irrevocable*, the British Cabinet nevertheless "perceived the embarrassment of its position. It was very sensible "of the inconvenience which would arise from the simultaneous pub- "lication of different rules with respect to neutral commerce. At the "last moment the Cabinet assembled, and after a long discussion it "was decided that the article to which we objected should be struck "out of the English Declaration. In a few hours, thanks to the "telegraph, the two Cabinets were in a position to attest their agree- "ment."

I became acquainted with this memoir, not from the columns of the *Moniteur*, but because the English Government itself inserted it as an official document in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the duties of neutrals on the occasion of the *Alabama* affair.

The memoir of M. DROUYN DE LHUYS is not simply a history of the negotiation; it is also a justification of the new rule, which M. THOUVENEL calls "the modern international law," and especially explains the negotiations with London as having for their object the final cession of the ancient rights when peace was signed.

The memoir is firstly a falsification of all French history in order to be able to say that the French law differs from the English. It ignores, therefore, the existence of Saint LOUIS, of FRANCIS I., and of HENRY IV., whose compilations and ordinances sanction the seizure of enemies' property on board neutral ships. It sees France only in some temporary acts of violence and illegality committed by the Convention, the Consulate, and the Empire.

2. The memoir treats the question as absolutely independent of the war which was about to ensue, and which could only have been brought to a successful termination by the maritime power of the Allies.

3. It presents as a reason for the pressure brought to bear on the English Cabinet a fictitious result; that is to say, the final abrogation of the ancient Law of Nations, in order to substitute for it the reign of liberty of commerce in the midst of the horrors of war.

I have already indicated that Russia desired this war in order to obtain the abrogation of the Right of Search. The French Government was, therefore, in accord with her, for it also sought in the same war the abolition of the Right of Search.

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that it *renounces the exercise of a right*, the existence of which it has always contested, or that it *reserves the application* of a principle which it has invariably refused to acknowledge."

The French decree of the 29th of March, however, runs as follows: "His Majesty consents for the present to waive *a portion of his rights* which belong to him as a belligerent Power by virtue of the Law of Nations."

We are thus enabled, thanks to this memoir, to understand the terror with which the QUEEN and Lord CLARENDON must have been struck by the revelation unexpectedly made by Lord PALMERSTON, that at the moment they were compromised in a war against Russia, with France for an ally, they were about to find themselves at war with Russia, and France as *her* ally. This, at least, was the way in which the matter had to be presented in order to obtain the result. The strong mind knows how to present things to the weak mind.

It is a secret that the QUEEN was not present on the 28th of March; it is a secret that the document which bears that date is a forgery. The opposition of the QUEEN has thus remained a secret. But it is no secret that Lord CLARENDON made a declaration on the 25th which contradicted the Order in Council of the 28th of March. I am now going to tell you something which will not fail to astonish you, but which you will nevertheless have to accept on my own word. Lord CLARENDON only yielded because Lord PALMERSTON engaged himself to re-establish the ancient law when the war was once terminated.

I have entered into these details in order to clear the way for what is about to follow; for, after all, it was then only the Crimean War. This war once over, England was to resume all her rights. Lord CLARENDON was still in the same post to exact the fulfilment of the engagement.

The progress of the war, the disasters before Sebastopol, and the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry which, in the words of Mr. ROEBUCK, its chairman, "revealed at every step a ground palpitating "with corruption," demonstrated all the importance of having kept Lord PALMERSTON apparently aloof from the conduct of the war. To repair the faults of his colleagues, the nation found no other way but that of placing him at the head of affairs. It is thus that Lord PALMERSTON was transformed from a Home Secretary into the Chief of the Cabinet, and that he held in his hands the destiny of the nation at the critical moment of the peace.

It was then a question of the final abandonment, or of the definitive confirmation of the provisory suspension of Maritime Rights of the 28th of March, 1854.

Lord CLARENDON had only lent his aid to the suspension by his silence, and that he had only given conditionally, yet it was to him that the task was intrusted of rendering the suspension definitive.

He undertook it, and threw himself into the work with a zeal and courage which indicated the most determined resolution. Not only did he accept the mission to Paris with this object, but he accepted it without restrictions. He consented to act on the secret and private letters of his new Chief. He avowed all this, either in the House of Lords, where he undertook to defend the act, or before the Committee of Inquiry into the Diplomatic service; and he congratulated himself and the nation that no one suspected what was being prepared. For otherwise it could not have been done!

To what can we attribute this sudden change?

If there were a plausible explanation, or, indeed, any explanation

whatever to give, I could not venture to offer the one I am going to offer.

It lays bare the hidden spring of all the events of our epoch. Presented by itself, it would be rejected as incredible and impossible. But the truth of this point, which it is of the last importance to comprehend, may be admitted when presented as a solution.

Lord CLARENDON, while guilty of an act which was nothing less than an attempt on the life of his country, did not act blindly; nevertheless he acted in good faith. He underwent the repetition of the process which had induced him to consent to the fraud of the Order in Council of the 28th of March. The combination which was unexpectedly presented to him was that of a new war with Russia, in which the latter should have France for an ally, with the English army and fleet already as hostages in their hands.

One observation before we proceed further. In France it has already been discovered that the presence of the Sardinian troops in the Crimea had no connexion either with Turkey or the war, and that they had been sent there with quite a different object; an object which Russia desired, and which neither England nor France desired. This object was the extinction of the temporal power of the Pope.* For those who thus judge, it will not be difficult to extend the application of the same system, and to admit the possibility of my proposition, that both the English and French troops were alike sent to Turkey for objects entirely different from those which had been put forward.

To explain the considerations which must have influenced Lord CLARENDON, I shall have to enter into some topographical details respecting Balaclava, where the English army was entrapped, and also with respect to Gallipoli, which could close against the English squadron the outlet of the Black Sea.

Balaclava is not a port at which the embarkation or disembarkation of an army can be effected. It is only a cleft in the peaked rocks which enclose the open bay that bears its name.†

But there was a magnificent port close by, that of Sebastopol. Why, then, did they not embark there? For the simple reason that this port was not in their hands.

The Allies had disembarked at Eupatoria, and had marched thence to Balaclava. Could not the English army have retraced its steps?

No, not without the consent of Russia, any more than it could embark at Sebastopol. To withdraw, then, it was necessary to ask this permission, which was done at the Congress of Paris, and such permission Russia granted.

The request appears in the official documents as follows:

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* The *Moscow Gazette* (an official journal) said, in 1868: "It is necessary for Russia that Italy should be united, but she can only be so at Rome, her natural capital. Is not the fall of the temporal power the triumph of orthodoxy (the Russian Church) even at Rome? Yes, it is with a higher interest than that of mere spectators that we survey this culminating point in the history of Italy."

† The correspondent of the *Times* of the 13th of October, 1854, said: "The public must not be indignant if, up to the present moment, not a single English or French gun has replied to the enemy, and that the Russians have employed the interval in constructing lines, trenches, and batteries to cover the town on the south.

"Few ships can enter at one time into Balaclava, in which there is only a small quay, and yet it is there that every English gun has to be disembarked."

Protocol 21 *of the Conferences at Paris.*

"The Earl of CLARENDON remarks that it would be useful, in order to hasten the evacuation of the Crimea, that the ships of the Allied Powers should be allowed freely to enter into the Port of Sebastopol; this facility, in the opinion of the first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain, would accelerate the embarkation of men and material by several weeks.

"The Russian Plenipotentiaries reply that they will take the orders of their government on this point."

The answer is as follows:

"*Protocol* 22 *of the Conferences at Paris.*

"The Russian plenipotentiaries announce that they have received "the order of their Government to declare, in reply to the request "which has been made to them, that the port of Sebastopol shall "remain open to the vessels of the Allies in order to accelerate the "embarkation of their troops and material of war."

This permission could not have been given by Russia without an equivalent. It is well known what Russia desired, and it is also well known that she received it. How she obtained it is involved in mystery, a mystery which exists solely in consequence of the belief that Sebastopol was taken, and that the war terminated in favour of the Allies. The war did not terminate by the factitious capture of Sebastopol, but by the real capture of Kars.

"Now," said the Emperor of the FRENCH, when the latter event happened, "we can make peace, for the honour of the Russian arms "is satisfied."

Sebastopol being "captured" on the 9th of Septemher (1855), the war continued until the month of March, 1856; that is to say, for seven months longer. The siege of Sebastopol then counted for nothing in the war, except in so far as it was the means of permitting the fall of Kars by confining the forces of the Allies and the Turks in the Crimea.

Not only was Sebastopol never taken, but there was never any intention to take it. It is the fortresses of Constantine and L'Etoile, which stand on an elevation on the north, whence the cannon can fire into the town, the arsenal, and the port, which constitute Sebastopol.

The Allies, after the victory of the Alma, arrive at these heights. But instead of establishing themselves there and carrying the fortresses by assault, as they could have done, as even the Russians themselves admitted, they leave the heights, make a *détour* to the left, and encamp on the low grounds to the south. There, instead of entering the town, they wait until the Russians construct lines and fortifications, in order to give themselves the pleasure of afterwards attacking them.

Mr. KINGLAKE has found among the papers of Lord RAGLAN (the English commander-in-chief), an explanation furnished by General TODLEBEN respecting the movements of Prince MENSCHIKOFF, which he gives in the Appendix, No. vii., of the eighth volume of his "History of the Crimean War,"* without stating how the document

* Tauchnitz Edition.

found its way into the hands of the English general. It is there said that the army of Prince MENSCHIKOFF was not in a position to maintain the northern forts against the Allies, and that it was to be expected that the latter would occupy the steep rocks of the Farm Mackenzie and the heights of Inkermann, so that his communication with the interior of Russia would have been cut off. But the fact is, that the Allies did not attack the forts, and that they did not occupy those heights, notwithstanding the retreat of the army of Prince MENSCHIKOFF. But if they did not take these forts, where was the use of besieging Sebastopol? And if they did not occupy those heights, and cut off all communication with the interior of Russia, they were themselves prisoners in the Crimea.

In a serious operation there would have been no middle course between taking the forts and returning to Eupatoria to embark. Lord RAGLAN, it is true, proposed to Marshal ST. ARNAUD to take these forts. The Marshal absolutely refused to do so, saying that his troops were fatigued. "But," said Lord RAGLAN, "his troops were not "fatigued; *there must have been some other reason.*" I may here state, by the way, that all the operations were directed by Colonel TROCHU, who had been sent out as the depositary of the private thoughts of the Emperor.*

In abandoning the heights of the north to encamp on the south, the Allies, says Mr. KINGLAKE, gave up the siege of a fortified town to transform themselves into invaders of the Russian Empire.† The communication with the interior being left free, Russia was able to direct against them as many troops as she desired, although they were masters of the sea. In short all the operations were regulated so as to make the world believe that maritime power had ceased to count for anything in the contests of nations.

Once arrived at the south, Lord RAGLAN wished to take the town; he calculated the loss to be incurred at 500 men,‡ but General CANROBERT, the successor of Marshal ST. ARNAUD, opposed the proposition, alleging that in that *hole* (the town) the Allies would be exposed to the fire of the northern forts, and to the army of Prince MENSCHIKOFF, which would doubtless reinforce the garrison of the forts and would take advantage of the heights for crushing the French and English troops.§

The Allies were able to take the town without a siege; but they did not wish to take it. They did not even occupy the Malakoff, then

* To appreciate what passed, it is not Turkey, or Russia, or the Crimea, or Sebastopol, that it is necessary for us to know, but two men one of whom does not appear prominently on the scene, and the other of whom had no command, namely, General Burgoyne and Colonel Trochu. The history of the latter is written in two articles bearing the titles: "The Part of General Trochu in the Revolution and Capitulation of Paris," and, "The Antecedents of General Trochu," which will be found in the *Diplomatic Review* for July, 1871. See also Kinglake, chapters 29 and 50, p. 116, vol. v. Tauchnitz Edition.

† Kinglake, ch. 56, vol. vi. p. 23. Tauchnitz Edition.

‡ On the 28th of September, Lord Raglan arrived at the camp of Sir George Cathcart, who had most pressingly solicited that an attack should be made on the town, and said to him: "We must wait until we receive the siege train." On which General Cathcart exclaimed: "Siege train! What would you do if you had it, for there is nothing to knock down." Kinglake, ch. 54, p. 269. Tauchnitz Edition.

§ Kinglake, ch. 55, p. 2, vol. vi.

a simple tower; they waited, giving the Russians time and liberty to fortify themselves, under pretence that the siege train had not arrived. They then passed a year in the siege, to enter at last that hole which they would not have been able to hold for a single day without the good pleasure of the Russians.

It is necessary to observe that Lord RAGLAN had by no means his liberty of action. He was controlled by telegrams from London, and also by the plan of the campaign, which had been drawn up by General BURGOYNE (for the abandonment of the heights on the north, and for the flank march to Balaclava), who was entirely in accord with Marshal ST. ARNAUD, and was in intimacy with the Emperor NAPOLEON. The reason which General BURGOYNE assigned for abandoning the north was that the town could be entered without difficulty on the south.*

Lord RAGLAN, in short, was hindered in all that he wished to do, and forced into all that he did. I do not say this to excuse him; quite the contrary. As General BROWN said, the Duke of WELLINGTON in a like case would have disobeyed the orders he had received. If Lord RAGLAN had not been a man of weak character he would never have been appointed Commander-in-Chief. He moreover had never had any command whatever in war, and had only seen war in his youth as aide-de-camp of the Duke of WELLINGTON.

Two important facts remain to be noticed. The first is, that the Russian army of observation in no way incommoded the Allies during the subsequent assaults of the Malakoff and the Redan.

The second is, that the Allies when they had once entered Sebastopol, were in no way disturbed by the guns from the forts on the north. On the arrival of the Allies before Sebastopol the *Times* correspondent wrote thus: "There are some persons who imagine that "if we had pursued the enemy after the battle of the Alma, it would "have been possible for us to enter the town on the southern side and "to have taken it by assault. *The forts of the north command the town*, "and would have done much injury to an army of occupation if such "an enterprise had succeeded."

No one appears to have observed the strange position in which the hostile armies found themselves after the entry of the Allies into the town. Having received great reinforcements they made no attempt on the fortresses, the guns of which commanded them; they made no attempt to cut off the communication with the interior of Russia. Their immense navy was struck with the same inertness as their regiments, and the only news furnished to Europe was that of a miserable and distant expedition to the Sea of Azoff to burn some small trading vessels laden with corn!

The same inertness seized the Russian army and the guns of the forts on the north. They were waiting on both sides. They were waiting for the fall of Kars.

A recital such as that which I present cannot fail to excite incredulity; I should rejoice if this incredulity provoked examination—

* Memorandum of General Burgoyne, September 21st, in Mr. Kinglake's work, ch. 45.

that is to say, study! But all the incredulity in the world, and the most passionate denunciation, can never either efface the words contained in the protocols of Paris, which I have cited, nor alter the fact that the forts on the north commanded Sebastopol; that they remained in possession of the Russians, not having been taken by the Allies; and that their fire was never directed upon the town during the seven months during which it was occupied by the Allies: a state of things inexplicable, inconceivable, and impossible, unless on the hypothesis that the purpose of the Russian Cabinet was to make it be believed that Sebastopol had been taken, and that the Russian arms had consequently been defeated.

It is absolutely impossible for a man who wishes to judge for himself and who possesses a knowledge of these unquestionable facts, not to admit that it is a mistake to suppose that Sebastopol was taken.

If Sebastopol was not taken the English army was taken; and to withdraw it from this trap it was necessary to submit to the conditions which Russia imposed. All this I saw beforehand. In a pamphlet which appeared at the time of the departure of the expedition, its consequences were fully and completely indicated, and they were summed up in the title which I gave to the publication, "The Spider "and the Fly."

Before leaving Balaclava it is essential to notice two consequences of the expedition to the Crimea. The first is, that it prevented the Allies from being joined by Austria, who foresaw a disastrous termination to it, and doubted their good faith.* The second is, that it crushed the sole and true enemy of Russia, the Circassians, that garrison of the Caucasus which protected Turkey, Persia, and India.

Gallipoli.—If the position of Balaclava was the most insignificant that could have been found on the face of the earth to be made the pivot of the affairs of the world, it was far otherwise with Gallipoli. Under this name, it is true, will be seen only a small village, which will be found on examining the map. But the right name of it is THE DARDANELLES, which, since the invention of gunpowder, put into

* Even Prussia would have joined the Allies could she have hoped that by this war she would have been delivered from Russia. But the protocol which recorded the maxim of leaving her frontiers intact deprived her of this hope. M. de Bunsen wrote thus, in a private letter to a friend in London, at the commencement of the war: "Everybody would be with you if they could only believe that you were with yourselves." One of his letters of the 26th of September, 1855, to the English Consul-General at Leipsic, has been published in his Memoirs, and contains the following passage:

"Are Helsingfors, the Aland Isles, and all Finland less aggressive than Sebastopol? Is not the Baltic more under the rule of Russia than the Black Sea? Is not Constantinople, with its Bosphorus, more protected than Sweden and Eastern Prussia?

"Has not England, as well as the Russian party, made of Denmark a perpetual invader of German territory? What have become of the first paragraphs of the Treaty of Vienna with respect to the independent kingdom of Poland? Are England and France *in good faith against Russia* as the enemy of European independence, as were the Allied Powers of 1813 against Napoleon? Such are the thoughts, and such are the words of those around me!"

Mr. Kinglake says: "By the resolution to leave the soil of Europe, and to make a descent on a maritime and distant province of Russia, the Western Powers deprived themselves of every right to expect the support of Austria and Prussia. The papers presented to Parliament have not made known the reasons for which the English Government rejected that great combination, and entered into separate engagements with France which led to the war."—Chap. 28.

the hand of him who possesses them the ways of the north and the south, open or close the Euxine, rule over the Mediterranean, and form the setting of that diamond, which OSMAN saw in his dream, placed between two sapphires and two emeralds, to constitute the ring of empire. NAPOLEON did not dream when he said "Constantinople "is the world." In these latter days the power of artillery has become gigantic; but our progress in this respect was anticipated by MAHMOUD the Conqueror, and from his time the monster pieces which he had cast, have reposed in their embrasures, the silent but all-powerful guardians of the Empire he created by their means.

The western and maritime Powers believe that the Ottoman Empire is about to fall under the terrible and irresistible blows of her neighbour of the north. They fly to her assistance; and in their generous design seize on the position and the fortresses which protected the empire, not against the north but against the south.

But what was the terrible danger from the north which menaced the Ottoman Empire? The war had broken out eleven months before the occupation of the Dardanelles, and not one Russian soldier had crossed the Danube or climbed the Balkan; not one of these terrible Christian subjects had either shouldered a musket or raised a standard. The invaders, thanks to the Allies, were encamped on Turkish soil, but no military operation was in progress. The Turkish forces lay tranquilly before the Russians, exceeding them three times in number, and had given proof of their superiority in engagements in which the Turks and not the Russians had been the assailants. At sea the superiority of the Turks was still more marked, and, but for the Allies, they would have carried the war into the enemy's country.* It is true that at the time of the occupation of Gallipoli the Russians had laid siege to Silistria, which was the answer to the declaration of war by the Allies. But this siege was a diplomatic and not a military operation.

In 1825, when the Turks were without an army, the Russians calculated the number of men required to force the Danube and the Balkan at 250,000. (See the work of General VALENTINI.)

In 1854 the Russian forces in the Principalities, after having already lost by sickness an immense number of men, only amounted with reinforcements to 80,000 men more or less.† By the Treaty of the twelfth of March, Turkey had formally subordinated her strategical movements to the Allies, and in consequence of that Treaty Silistria was isolated from the Turkish armies, one of which, consisting of 80,000 men, was encamped at Shumla, and abandoned to such defence as could be made by a garrison of 12,000 men. A portion of the Allied forces went to encamp at Varna, in order to entitle it to control

* Examination of Sir James Graham before the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry.

Q. 21. 276. "Have not the Turks proposed to send an expedition to Circassia?"

A. "I believe so, and after the experience at Sinope it was thought that it would be too dangerous for them to go there alone."

Q. 21. 276. "Who prevented them?"

A. "The common sense of all the authorities except those of the Turks."

† For an account of the ravages made by sickness in the Russian army in Wallachia, see the Appendix to Moltke's work on the campaigns of 1828-29.

the Turks, but did not advance to their assistance. All the forces, then, which Russia had put in the field were concentrated before that small place; and at length they retired broken, leaving in the trenches three times the number in dead of the garrison of the place. Not the smallest danger, then, existed for the Ottoman Empire, and if there had been any danger it was not by the occupation of Gallipoli that it would have been dissipated.

Here is the way in which the English journal (the *Times*), which had the merit of making the war, expressed itself:

"Swift and terrible has been the retribution which has fallen on "the Russian army, engaged in this shameful and unprovoked aggres- "sion, and the chastisement is rendered the more humiliating to the "pride of the Czar, and important to the political independence of the "Porte by the fact that a single division of the Turkish army, un- "assisted by European troops, has sufficed to repel the invader with "unexampled losses. These glorious results belong to the Turkish "arms exclusively, and the soldiers of the Sultan never fought with "more devoted and suceessful bravery than on this occasion."—*Times*, June 22nd, 1854.

Though the truth is here told, it is nevertheless disguised. That result was obtained not by a division of the Turkish Army, but by the single garrison of Silistria. It is clear at least that the Turks knew how to defend themselves, and it must be evident that if they had not been capable of doing so, they would not have been left to themselves.

Let us now see how this same newspaper expressed itself when "the "International Arbitration" was sitting at Vienna, and before the Turks had declared war.

"We must oppose the aggrandisement of Russia, and *so long as this* "*is the only alternative*, we must maintain the integrity of the Otto- "man Empire; but of this we may be very sure, that while a tumble- "down Turkish Empire lies at the feet of a powerful military "monarchy, and our method of curbing the latter is by 'maintaining' "the former, we shall never enjoy much respite from troubles like "the present."—*Times*, September 28th, 1853.

During that long period of agitation I did not cease to say what has here been said, and a great many things besides, not only by writing, but by convoking popular meetings in every town of the three kingdoms; and that without the delay of a single day during six months. I especially denounced the infamy and the imbecility of going to the assistance of an Empire with the sole object of partaking the spoils of it with its enemy.* Here is the way in which the *Times* treated my efforts even after the arrival of the news of the first victory of the Turks, Oltenitza, which had just given the first confirmation of my predictions.

"We fully anticipate that the Ottomans will ultimately be dis- "comfited. . . . If the Russian Empire, so far from threatening

* The person who directed the press in England said to me in a whisper, "For God's sake be silent. You are deranging all our plans. Don't you know *that we are going to have Egypt?*" That Egypt which Catherine had already offered to France,

" the balance of power, or the liberties of more civilised States—so far " from menacing the Turkish Empire with absorption in its own " —is actually unable to cope with OMAR PASHA in the Danubian " Principalities, the most difficult and alarming question of modern " state politics will have been resolved at once. Mr. DAVID UR- " QUHART may then claim such a triumph for political foresight as " never before fell to the lot of man, but such will be the general satis- " faction of Europe at the result that nobody—we think we may " promise him—will be at all likely to repine at his exclusive credit." —*Times*, Nov. 11, 1853.

If the Allies had come to support the Turks they would have been directed to the theatre of war, and, in concert with them, they would have driven back the Russians beyond the Pruth. If they did not do that, it was because they did not go there to defend the Turks against the Russians, but, as Lord RAGLAN said, "for some other "thing." This "other thing" was explained in the words of Lord HERBERT, "We were in accord with our enemy."* That is to say, that the enemy was only so in appearance, and that they acted with that enemy against their Ally, and against themselves.

On this hypothesis what operation could be conceived more happily combined than to seize on the Dardanelles, and to fortify themselves there? How, if not on such a hypothesis, can we explain the taking possession of the Thracian isthmus, and the fortification of it in all its breadth as far as the Gulph of Saros; fortifications which were constructed not against the Russians but against the Turks? This is what was done.

But there is a distinction to be made between the Allies. The occupation of Gallipoli was in common; the troops of the two nations disembarked there alike. The English soldiers worked at the lines in concert with the French soldiers, and constructed a third of them. But it was the French flag that was there hoisted; the French administration was there established; and on the 21st of June the English left, and the French remained in exclusive possession of the isthmus and of the forts on the west coast of the Dardanelles. France, therefore, had the key to the Black Sea, and Constantinople in her hands.

A few days before the departure of the troops from England, Lord RAGLAN being anxious as to the results, and not wishing to trust to the advice of political persons, as they are called, sought in all ways to form just ideas respecting the position of Turkey. He sent me, under the seal of secresy, the plan of campaign, which had just come from Paris, and appointed two superior officers to examine it with me; one being the brother of that General BURGOYNE who played so fatal a part in the whole affair, and the other being General (then Colonel) MATSIN. This plan of campaign was to occupy and fortify Gallipoli, and then to push on and attack Sebastopol. The first words I uttered were, "Here is the plan of the campaign with which your enemy would have furnished you, if you had applied to him;" a proposition which I developed by showing that it involved the double vice of a de-

* Pronounced on the second conference at Vienna in session *during the war*.

fensive war and an offensive war; a defensive war which defended nothing, and an offensive war directed against an invulnerable point of the enemy's territory while avoiding all his vulnerable points.

I have reason to believe that Lord RAGLAN'S resistance caused at that time the abandonment of the second part of the plan; and we know that when it was resumed later, and ordered from London, he pronounced himself strongly against it, and only gave way on the insinuation of cowardice.*

During these two mornings Paris was perpetually on the lips of my interlocutors. Whenever I asked the source of the information they were possessed of, that source stopped at Paris. The information they had thence drawn, was, in substance, that Turkey was unable to defend herself; that the most frightful disorder reigned in all the branches of her administration; that money was absolutely wanting; that, at a signal given by the march of an invading army across Bulgaria, the Christian populations would rise from one end of the Empire to the other; and, finally, that the Russian forces, supported by reinforcements, who were assembling in Bessarabia, would be irresistible, and would crush all in their passage. The conclusion to be drawn from all this was, firstly, to act on a field where the Allies would not be encumbered by the Turks, and, secondly, in case of a check, to insure a retreat against all eventualities, one of which was the possible union of the Turks with the Russians against the Allies.

From this proceeded the occupation and fortification of Gallipoli. With regard to the choice of the Crimea as a field, it was based on a proposition which the *Times* newspaper did not cease, day by day, to put forward, that Sebastopol was the centre of Russian power, and that from this fortress she menaced not only Turkey but the Indies and the repose of the world.

It was not difficult for me to demolish these ridiculous suppositions, and to demonstrate that it was "not Turkey, but Russia who was "in danger." Six months later, the latter of these two officers "(General MATSIN), said to me: "All that you told us has come "true; absolutely *all*."

An incident has occurred to me which I ought to add in order to make this story complete:—

In the early part of 1854, when the tantalising aspect of the whole power of Europe brought to bear on their enemy, was kept floating before the eyes of the Turks, they sent to England as ambassador extraordinary, Namic Pasha, who, on two former occasions, had been sent in the same capacity, in reference to Egypt. He was to make a formal request for succour. I succeeded in impressing him, first, with the inutility of European aid, secondly, with its danger, and

* Some days before the departure of the troops ten generals and superior officers breakfasted with me. In taking leave Lord Clyde used the French expression "au revoir." I replied, "I shall never see you again, neither you nor any of these gentlemen, for you are going to your graves." Later on in the same day, the Duke of Cambridge asked me if these words had been seriously spoken, and this was my answer: "Never were words spoken more seriously, or with greater certainty. I know why you are sent. The accident of your birth, and the accidents of sickness, wounds, or service excepted, not one of you will return." This was realised to the letter, as applied to the first expedition sent out.

urged upon him his immediate return to Constantinople, and were he even thereby to imperil his head, to urge the Government to desist from the fatal step they were about through him to take. He left me one night about 12 o'clock, using these words, "*la nuit porte conseil.*" On returning to his hotel across the street, he found his son attacked by a sudden illness of which he died that night, and so the chance was lost.

The Turkish Ambassador in London during the affair of Candia said to Mr. C—— "In 1854 we did not believe Mr. URQUHART, but "it is not so now." And so they acted of themselves without the knowledge of the Powers, and in spite of the Powers, and settled the matter at once, as they might have done in 1854.

To-day it will appear incredible that the expedition to the Crimea should have constituted the first plan of campaign; for the English Government caused it to be believed that this expedition was only an afterthought, and adopted "because there was nothing else to "be done."*

On the 12th of December, 1854, Lord RUSSELL explained the operation as follows: "England and France had sent an army *to "Turkey.* If this army had been brought back to Constantinople for "the winter, the people of this country would have been greatly "disappointed. There only remained then the expedition to the "Crimea."

Let us come now to the explanations given by the English Government with respect to Gallipoli. The Government did not explain itself beforehand, nor did it explain itself in the House. These explanations, such as they are, were extorted by questions, vague as they were, in the Committee of Inquiry on Sebastopol. The first question put to the Duke of NEWCASTLE was, "*Why did you go to Gallipoli?*" He answered that the Government had acted on the report of General BURGOYNE, who, in concurrence with a French officer, Colonel ARDENT, had advised the occupation of Gallipoli for strategical reasons, *which he did not explain.*

General BURGOYNE, on being called before the Committee, answers the question, "Did you recommend the occupation of Gallipoli?" in these words: "When I quitted England I passed through Paris, and "I there found that the desire existed of assisting the Turks, but that "the arrival of an irresistible force of Russian troops was expected; so "that the retreat of the Allies from Constantinople might be cut off, "as the Russians on arriving at Adrianople would be nearer Gallipoli "than Constantinople." All comment here is superfluous. The plan came from Paris. The joint occupation was changed into a separate occupation, and at the time the Treaty of Peace was being discussed at Paris, the English squadron in the Black Sea found itself in face of the French squadron with the outlet of the Dardanelles closed, even in the case of a victory obtained over the latter.

We are now in a position to judge of the effect on Lord CLARENDON of the revelation which had been made to him by his colleague of the secret intentions of Russia and France.

* Lord Granville's words in announcing the news.

It was not *an* army, but *the* army of England which was locked up at Balaclava, for she had no other.

It is true that all this was factitious, for knowing how to use her maritime strength, and knowing how to lean on Turkey for support, England would in an instant have been mistress of the position. But for this another man was required; a man capable at once of profiting by the circumstances, and disencumbering himself of Lord PALMERSTON. Lord CLARENDON only saw before him the abyss, and joyfully accepted the bridge of safety which was offered to him.

It is thus, under the veil of absolute mystery, that the Declaration of Paris was carried through.

It is thus that naval strength was confiscated and abolished by the two plenipotentiaries of the maritime Powers, each one of whom believed that he was serving his country by insuring it against a danger which was coming to it from the other.

During the course of these operations those who were associated with them did not lead a tranquil life; they had moments of doubt; they were struck by the contradictions; they had crises of anguish. It will not be out of place here to quote some of the phrases which fell from their lips.

Lord RUSSELL. "This inextricable mystery, the Crimean war."

Lord HERBERT. "There was a peculiarity in this war that we "were in accord with our Enemy but not with our Ally."

Mr. GLADSTONE. "Seek a fortress in the deserts of Tartary to keep "there for two years the forces of the west."

Mr. BRIGHT. "The friendship of England has done more harm in "one year to the Ottoman Empire than the enmity of Russia for a "century."

Lord PONSONBY. "Formerly men had the Garter for having killed "the QUEEN'S enemies; Lord ABERDEEN has received it for having "killed the QUEEN'S subjects."

Lastly, the Duke of NEWCASTLE, the war minister of the day, he who, according to Mr. KINGLAKE, was the author, with the *Times*, of the Crimean expedition, who drew up the despatch which gave orders for the expedition, revolted at the consequences of it so far as to send despatches without the knowledge of his colleagues to order operations unknown to the admiral; orders which were not executed. The despatch, nevertheless, which ordered the invasion of the Crimea, imposed as a condition the occupation of the Isthmus of Perecop, in order to sever the communication between the Crimea and Russia; a condition which was never fulfilled.

The opposition in Parliament made its discontent felt by some epigrammatic sentences of Mr. DISRAELI; "a war of connivance and "credulity;" "a just but unnecessary war."

These words were dropped here and there at intervals in Parliament, at public meetings, and in provincial newspapers. They came after the blow had been given, and remained without effect. No one opposed what they condemned—no one dared to do so.

On the night of the 27th of March, Lord EGLINTON went to Lord DERBY to induce him either to remonstrate privately with the

ministers, or to make a protest in the House. Lord DERBY cut him short by saying: "You have no occasion to speak to me, I know "more than you do; for I believe that the war will end disastrously, "but *I dare not say a word.*"

Lord DERBY did not open his lips during the course of the war, and reserved himself for stating his sentiments at its conclusion, and on the occasion of which we are now treating.

"The Declaration of Paris! Call it the capitulation of Paris." Again. "You are ringing your bells; the day will come when you "will wring your hands. You have sacrificed the greatness of Eng- "land on the altar of Russian ambition."

At a later period he again became minister, and did all he could to support and apply to the other Powers the same "capitulation." To this point of degradation then do those ministers fall to whom has been attributed an arbitrary power without limit, without responsibility, and without control.

A Cabinet is believed to be a protection against the usurpation of a single minister. True it is that in ordinary affairs the Cabinet has cognisance of what each minister does. But it is not so at critical periods, and when there is one minister stronger than his colleagues, the Cabinet then counts for nothing.* Such is the conclusion to be drawn from the preceding narrative. But, as this conclusion furnishes a basis for the only course that can save Europe from the abysss, I adduce in support of its two anterior facts.

In his "Embassy to London," M. GUIZOT says that Lord PALMERSTON "did not communicate the despatches he received to his "colleagues," and he adds that this was known to the other ambassadors as well as himself.

In 1851 Queen VICTORIA dismissed Lord PALMERSTON from the office of Secretary for Foreign Affairs, for having given the support of England to the "Coup d'Etat," despite a decision of the Cabinet Council and Her own orders; and on that occasion she caused Lord RUSSELL, then Prime Minister, to read to Parliament a letter which she had written in relation to the Danish negotiations, in which she alleged that Lord PALMERSTON had deceived her by concealing foreign despatches, and by changing the tenor of those which he had to write, and in which She threatened him with removal from office if he dared to recur in future to such means.

It remains to indicate at least the commercial and financial phase of the question.

In the two preceding wars between Russia and England, the produce of the former was brought into the ports of the latter, and the submis-

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* In order to send an army to the Crimea, it was necessary that there should be a Cabinet Council; and this was in fact held. But Mr. Kinglake affirms that, with the exception of Lord Palmerston and the Duke of Newcastle, who read the despatch, no member of the Cabinet knew anything about it. He declares that the others were *drugged*, and were asleep during the sitting.

There has never been any contradiction of this statement. In the numerous reviews of his work, not the slightest allusion has ever been made to this astounding accusation.—Kinglake, ch. 31, p. 100, vol. iii. Tauchnitz Edition.

sion of Russia followed quickly thereon.* But in 1854 it was quite another thing. The commerce of Russia would not simply have been arrested for the time, but extinguished in the future. Other sources would have been open, and no more ships would have made their appearance in the Baltic or Black Sea. The commerce of Russia is not a natural, but a factitious commerce, which has been created by her diplomacy, which exerts itself to keep down the productions or embarrass the exchanges of the other countries who compete with her in raw produce. For her, therefore, it was existence which was at stake, and which depended on "the Order in Council" of the 28th of March.

By that Order, in escaping from this terrible peril, she became the furnisher of England, who was not slow to legalise direct commerce with her, and to buy from her on account of the Government.†

The English merchants carrying on the commerce of the Baltic beset poor Lord CLARENDON in order to explain to him that the war would be interminable, and must end disastrously if this system, which to them was incomprehensible, were not put a stop to; English merchandise did not go to Russia, so that Russian produce was paid for in gold; and the "Bankers' Circular" estimates the amount received by her from the foreigner at fifty millions sterling.

The Russian troops on entering the Danubian Principalities, found there an enormous accumulation of cereals, the rapid increase of which had necessitated the war in order to save her own exportations.‡ They consumed it on the spot. The spoil drawn from these unhappy provinces has been calculated at 4,800,000*l.*

England, notwithstanding the war, continued to pay the Russo-Dutch Loan, the payment of which had been accorded for the purpose of engaging Russia not to disturb the Treaties of 1815. It is said that she capitalised this revenue, and that from such source the cost of invading the Turkish territory was defrayed. The expenses of the war were for her a trifle. What others lose or expend is for her a gain. France, England, Sardinia, and Turkey expended 200,000,000*l.* and 250,000 men, with the result of having captured the town but not the port of Sebastopol.

The picture which I have just drawn might appear not to belong to reality. I cannot say to you "*Circumspice;*" because for us nothing is done: all that happens is only news. One drives away the other, and "the event of the day before yesterday is the thing that

* It does not appear that there were any operations, even of privateers, in the so-called war with Russia of 1807. Everything in the Declaration (drawn up by Mr. Canning), in the writings of Sir Robert Adair, and in the Treaty of Peace, agrees with this supposition. That Treaty was signed on the $\frac{6}{18}$ July, 1812. Russia had, therefore, maintained a nominal war of five years with England—a thing impossible if the war had been a reality. The argument in the text is very much strengthened by the bringing out of this unparalleled event—a war of five years, in which the State which declared war did not dare to commit a hostile act, and in which the State against which war was declared forbore to fight.—ED. DIPLOMATIC REVIEW.

† The Order in Council of the 15th of April, 1854, permits "the subjects of Her Majesty," as also "the subjects of every neutral or friendly State, notwithstanding the hostilities with Russia, to traffic freely with all ports not blockaded."

‡ They had in 1852 exported to England alone one million and a half quarters. M. Joanesco calculated that an advance in price of 10 per cent. would double the exportation. But since 1853 they have never been tranquil, thanks to England and France.

" is most unknown to-day" (GUIZOT). This follows as a matter of course; for no one has received the charge of examining the affairs of nations judicially; a thing which was and is very easy, only you have not thought of it, and no one has told you of it.

I am, however, about to convince you that this is neither an ingenious romance nor an evil dream, by citing some words uttered at the very time by men of mark, in presence of the guilty actors, who had not a single word to offer in their defence.

Mr. WEGUELIN said on the occasion of his election for Southampton, "I headed a deputation of thirty or forty merchants in the " shipping trade with Russia, who waited upon Lords CLARENDON " and GRANVILLE, in order to recommend the Government to stop " the trade with Russia. We told them that such a course would do " more to bring the war to a termination than the proceedings of " any army; they would cripple their resources. The ministers " replied that they were satisfied with the correctness of our reasons, " but could not possibly take it upon themselves to quarrel with " Prussia; they could not afford to go to war with Prussia."

Mr. J. G. PHILLIMORE said in the House of Commons on the 4th of July, 1854, "If the principle is to be adopted, that being at war " you ought not to do the enemy all the mischief you can, and while " carrying on war to allow him in a great measure to enjoy advantages " of peace, you had better disband your armies, recall your ships, and " lower your flag."

Mr. MITCHELL, one of the principal Russia merchants, said also in the House of Commons on the same day, "Russia exports produce " annually to the amount of from 12,000,000*l.* to 15,000,000*l.* sterling, " a large portion of which goes directly in the shape of revenue to " the Great Russian landholders. If, therefore, you destroyed that " outlet for their produce, there could be no question that its effect " would be to deprive the only class, except the Emperor himself, " which had any influence upon the Government of this country, of " their revenue. The only way of proceeding effectually was to stop " the trade of the country."

Mr. (now Sir ROBERT) COLLIER, on the 5th of September, 1855, said, in the House of Commons: "It has been said truly that we are " not a great military Power, and that the country has not a great " standing army, but that we have fleets which, if they cannot de- " stroy the forts and fleets of Russia, can, at least, blockade every port " that Power possesses. . . . . At the outbreak of the war the rouble " fell from par 38 pence to 32 pence, and it was confidently antici- " pated that before the war had lasted many months it would fall " much lower, that a serious financial crisis would overtake the Em- " peror, that ruin and poverty would fall upon the landholders, and " that national bankruptcy must ensue. . . . . That our efforts have " not met with the desired result is certain, but, indeed, the reverse. " So far from our having blockaded the principal ports, the exports " from that Empire have been greater than ever. The whole case " may be summed up in the statement that Russian commerce has " not been injured, that 10,000,000*l.* of English money, instead of

" 11,000,000*l.*, the ordinary amount, has been paid to her, and that " the rouble, which had declined to 32 pence, has risen to par."

In a commercial circular, Messieurs SMITH and CHARLES say: " The announcement of the stoppage *in transitu* of the Russian com- "merce, which would be the wisest and most philosophic decision " that could be adopted, would be received with universal satisfaction, " because it would put an end to the war by preventing the Czar " from being supplied with English capital, and by exciting a uni- " versal animosity against the war among his subjects." October 21, 1854.

Would it be believed that there is in Europe a single man who is ignorant that Russian commerce was not stopped? Would it be believed that there is a single man who believes that it was stopped? Would it be believed that a publicist, who makes it his duty to write a history of that war, has come to the latter conclusion, and that he has published it to the world, after having been crowned by that very same Institute before which M. DROUYN DE LHUYS presented himself memoir in hand? I put these questions, because at the moment when I was occupied with translating the passages which you have just read, a work was sent to me through the post which contains this astounding and incredible proposition. The title of it is " Contem- " poraneous Wars," by M. PAUL BEAULIEU, and it is published under the auspices of " The International League of Peace." In good truth PETER THE GREAT had reason to say that Europe was entering on its second childhood, and he was right in basing on this his project of universal dominion.

In the preface to the English edition it is said that this Association proposes " to substitute for the sword international arbitration, to " decide the differences between nations," and the author relies on the number of killed and dead, and the amount of expenditure incurred in the Crimean War, to demonstrate the necessity of this arbitration. The poor idiots do not know, they cannot see, that this Crimean War was the result of an arbitration (the Conferences of Vienna), and that it terminated by inaugurating, at the Congress of the Peace, this new maxim of arbitration. See to what a pitch we have arrived when the judicial process for ascertaining facts before acting has been abolished! The result can only be brutality in acts and imbecility in mind. Such a people cannot, and ought not to, live. They can only do so by acknowledging in themselves the necessity of preventing decay, and by correcting themselves. This happy disposition has been developed in France; but, in order for it to bear fruit, that nation must learn in what it has failed.

It is in view of this possibility, and of the return of France by these means to the path of law in the management of affairs, that I have abandoned the reticence which I have hitherto observed on these matters, and that I have here told all that I know without reserve.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

DAVID URQUHART.

DOCUMENTS FOR REFERENCE.

Restoration of the Maritime Power of France.

Extract from the Memorial of the Foreign Affairs Committees signed on the 4th of September, 1870, and addressed to the Emperor of the French; and since transmitted to M. Jules Favre.

We, therefore, beg to point out the neglect by Your Majesty of a most important means of action against the enemy of France in not sequestrating her property placed within reach of seizure as being in passage over the sea. Thousands of Frenchmen are slaughtered by an enemy who is devastating France, and is about to reduce the neighbourhood of the capital to a desert. Yet that enemy is allowed to carry on his trade in peace under a neutral flag. We are told that this abnegation of maritime power is to assimilate war on sea to war on land where private property is respected. Private property is not respected by the Prussians in France.

The cause assigned for sparing Prussia at sea is the Declaration of Paris, which forbids the seizure of enemy's goods in neutral vessels, a practice constantly followed by France as well as England till the Crimean War in 1854. But what is the Declaration of Paris? England is not bound by it, for even supposing that any State could alter the Law of Nations, the Conference at Paris was not competent to make laws for Englishmen. That can only be done by the Queen and Parliament. The Queen of England never gave any authority to Lord Clarendon to sign the Declaration of Paris. She has never ratified it. Not one of Her Majesty's Servants has ever dared to ask for an Act of Parliament to sanction this change in the Laws of England. But both Lord Clarendon and that Minister of your Majesty who was most active in procuring the adoption of the principles of the Declaration of Paris at the commencement of the Crimean War, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, have sanctioned the violation of the Declaration of Paris. For that Declaration says, "Privateering is and remains abolished." Yet both M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord Clarendon have sanctioned the use of privateers by Chile in her war against Spain. Chile had adhered to the Declaration of Paris.

If France were at war with England, and with England alone, the prohibition to seize enemy's goods in neutral vessels would indeed be as useful to France as it now is to Prussia; for her commerce being safe under the neutral flag, her whole navy and mercantile marine could be employed in the invasion of England, which, not being a military Power of the first class, could be overpowered by numbers. But if France were at war with England, it does not follow that England would consent like France at this moment to forego the use of her naval means for the sake of a fraudulent agreement to which she has never been asked to consent.

EXTRACT FROM "LA DIPLOMATIE DU SECOND EMPIRE ET CELLE DU 4 SEPTEMBRE, 1870," BY EUGENE POUJADE. PARIS: SANDOZ AND FISCHBACHER.

. . . . . .

But it is principally to our naval forces that we would awaken all the attention of our Government. A Greek poet said to his fellow-countrymen, "Above all things, maintain peace in the waters that wash your coasts;" so we say to our Government, "Above all things render yourselves formidable at sea, everywhere, in the Mediterranean, on the ocean, and wherever your flag can float." Do not depend too much on ironclads and monitors; recollect the wretched figure our fleet made during the late war. But resume, without hesitation, a powerful arm which perfidious councils have induced you to lay aside. If it has been easy for Russia to erase from the Treaty of Paris the clause which was disagreeable to her, your withdrawal cannot be refused from one which is actual death to your maritime power, as it is to that of Great Britain. Boldly restore privateering; prepare to renew, in case of need, the exploits of DUGUAY-TROUIN, and SURCOUF, and to destroy the commerce of your enemies wherever you meet it. After the atrocious violations by Prussia of the Law of Nations on land, return at once to the ancient Law of Nations with regard to the sea: the more so, since the Declaration of Paris has never been wholly respected, for Russia has violated it in the Black Sea, and France and England have done so with respect to the United States and Chili. It would be too long to instance here all the violations of it that have been committed; but these facts are sufficient to show that France has it in her power to free herself from a chain which she gratuitously imposed on herself, and which has diminished her strength, and that of her ancient ally by one half. We may be sure that noble England, not the England of a GLADSTONE and a GRANVILLE, but true England, will applaud the manly resolution of France, and that by the very act of her having recovered her action and the use of all her strength, France will have advanced more than half-way on the course which she has to take for resuming her rank in the world. The re-establishment, pure and simple, of privateering by France, or, in other words, the announcement, that she liberates herself from the Declaration of Paris, would be equivalent to a revival of an intimate effective alliance with Great Britain, as it would be the best and the only practical answer at the present time to the interviews of Gastein and Salzbourg.

Lord NELSON, speaking in the House of Lords in 1801, on the subject of the Armed Neutrality, and of the principle "free ships make free goods," which it sought to impose, exclaimed, "A proposition so monstrous in itself, so contrary to the Law of Nations, and so injurious to the maritime interests of this country, that if the maintenance of it had been persisted in, it would have been our duty never to have ceased war with those Powers whilst a single man, a single shilling, or a single drop of blood remained in the country."

The maritime strength of a country has this reassuring character, that it is of an opposite character to that of large permanent land armies, especially those which to-day on the European Continent, and particularly in Germany, Austria, and Russia, threaten the peace of the world; it is essentially a defensive force; it is calculated for the protection of the coasts and of commerce on the vast plains of the ocean, but it can also become a terrible instrument for ruining the countries which should again seek to crush us.

We have the firm hope that great destinies are in the future promised to the French navy, and that henceforth England, taught by events and enlightened as to her destiny, will not envy its triumphs. Happy will those be who shall have it in their power one day to lavish for France in the ranks of her armies and on her fleets the treasures of their youth and of their noble blood! Nothing will equal the recompense they will receive, for it will be France, the most beautiful and noble of nations, who will say, to those who will have restored her to herself, what Don DIEGO said to the CID:

> Come kiss ye this cheek and remember the place
> Of the insult your courage doth this day efface.

THE END.

LONDON:
C. WHITING, BEAUFORT HOUSE, DUKE STREET, LINCOLN'S INN FIELDS.

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